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What If the NCAA Was a State Actor? 
Here, There, and Beyond 
Terri Peretti* 
In 1988, in NCAA v. Tarkanian, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) was not a state actor and, thus, did not have to abide by 
constitutional requirements, such as due process of law.1  This 
simple, but controversial, ruling has had enormous consequences.  
By ignoring the interdependencies of money and power between 
the Association and public universities, the Court has shielded the 
NCAA from judicial review and left the liberty and property 
interests of college athletes and coaches unprotected.  Those 
interests are not insignificant.  Because of NCAA actions, college 
athletes may lose their eligibility to compete, scholarships, and 
access to an exclusive path to a professional sports career.2  
Because of NCAA actions, coaches may lose their jobs and 
salaries, and their future career opportunities may be restricted.3  
 
* Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University.  Comments and 
questions can be sent to the author at tperetti@scu.edu. 
 1.  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988). 
 2.  See, e.g., Dan Kane, U.S. Senate hearing on college athletics will 
feature former UNC athlete, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 8, 2014), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/07/08/3992293/us-senate-hearing-on-
college-athletics.html; Tim Keown, Jamar Samuels and the NCAA follies, 
ESPN (Mar. 21, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/ 
keown-120320/jamar-samuels-suspension-kansas-state-tournament-game-mo
re-ncaa-hypocrisy; Jake Trotter, Banned OU football player Mike Balogun 
breaks silence, NEWSOK (Mar. 10, 2010, 8:35 AM), http://newsok.com/ 
banned-ou-football-player-mike-balogun-breaks-silence/article/3445203. 
 3.  See, e.g., Gary Klein, Ex-USC assistant Todd McNair seeks 
vindication from Reggie Bush saga, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2014, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/usc/la-sp-usc-ncaa-mcnair-20140609-story.htm
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Because of NCAA actions, athletic programs may lose millions of 
dollars.4  The Association’s investigatory and enforcement 
proceedings that generate these results have been likened to 
“kangaroo courts.”5  As long as Tarkanian stands as good law, 
however, the NCAA is free to offer as much, or as little, 
substantive and procedural fairness as it chooses, and those 
subject to its investigations and sanctions will have no judicial 
recourse under the Constitution. 
This Article examines several questions regarding this 
controversial and highly consequential decision.  First, was 
Tarkanian wrongly decided?  Second, what would its reversal 
require—doctrinally, politically, and strategically?  Third, what 
consequences would likely follow? 
Before addressing these questions, Parts I and II of this 
Article describe the state action doctrine and the Tarkanian case, 
respectively.  Part III observes several weaknesses in the Court’s 
 
l (former running back coach for the University of Southern California, Todd 
McNair); Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, Standing Up To the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, 
March 24, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/03/24/opinion/nocera-standing-up-to-the-ncaa.html (former head 
basketball coach for the State University of New York, Buffalo, Tim Cohane). 
 4.  See, e.g., Steve Eder & Mac Tracy, N.C.A.A. Decides to Roll Back 
Sanctions against Penn State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2014, at B12.  The most 
notorious example involves Penn State, which was sanctioned in the wake of 
Jerry Sandusky’s child sexual abuse conviction.  Id.  The NCAA fined Penn 
State $60 million, imposed a four-year ban on post-season play, reduced 
scholarships, and vacated all of its 1998 to 2011 accolades.  Id.  The NCAA 
later eased some of these sanctions.  Id. 
 5.  See Kerry Eggers, On Adelman’s wife, NCAA’s Kangaroo Court, late 
Pac-12 Hoop starts and much more, PORTLAND TRIBUNE (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:00 
AM), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/12-sports/127132-on-adelmans-wife-
aldridge-ncaas-kangaroo-court-late-pac-12-hoop-starts-and-much-more; Ali 
Fogarty, Legislators Introduce NCAA Accountability Act, ONWARD STATE 
(Aug. 2, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://onwardstate.com/2013/08/02/legislators-
introduce-ncaa-accountability-act/; Barry Petchesky, A Miami Player Filed a 
Police Report Over the NCAA’s “Intimidation,” DEADSPIN (June 4, 2013, 10:58 
AM), http://deadspin.com/a-miami-player-filed-a-police-report-over-the-ncaas-
i-511200084; Carter Williams, How handling Penn State made the NCAA 
Look foolish again, SUU NEWS (July 23, 2012), http://www.suunews.com/ 
weblogs/monday-morning-quarterback/2012/jul/23/how-handling-penn-state-
made-the-ncaa-look-foolish/.  New York Times columnist Joe Nocera has 
employed the “Star Chamber” label in describing the NCAA’s justice system.  
See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, N.C.A.A.’s ‘Justice’ System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, 
at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/-ncaas-
justice-system.html.  
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analysis and concludes that Tarkanian should indeed be reversed.  
Part IV discusses the doctrinal considerations in Tarkanian’s 
reversal, observing that the distance “from here to there” is 
small—in part due to the Court’s rediscovery of the “entwinement” 
standard which it used in 2001 to find that a high school athletic 
association was a state actor.6  While overturning the 5-4 
Tarkanian decision would require little doctrinal change and only 
a single vote, the impetus for reversal must nonetheless be 
political, as Part V argues.  Evidence regarding doctrinal change 
in the fields of reapportionment, the Second Amendment, and 
state action itself suggests that social and political movements are 
critical ingredients for constitutional change.  This is a valuable 
lesson for reformers seeking to subject the NCAA to judicial 
oversight.  Part VI explores several strategic factors in securing 
Tarkanian’s reversal, including emphasizing the disparate racial 
impact of NCAA policies and sanctions; taking advantage of an 
increasingly tarnished NCAA image as it faces multiple lawsuits 
and growing media and congressional criticism; and electing more 
Democrats, especially to the White House and Senate, to help shift 
the judiciary in a leftward direction.  Part VII concludes by 
discussing the implications of the Supreme Court overturning 
Tarkanian and finding that the NCAA is a state actor. 
I. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
Since 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases,7 the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the Fourteenth Amendment only restricts 
state action, not private action.8  The apparent simplicity of this 
 
 6.  See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 288, 290–91 (2001). 
 7.  United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 11 
(1883). 
 8.  See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1961).  At the simplest 
level, only statutes enacted by a governmental body or the actions of 
government officials qualify as state action, while conduct by private citizens 
or organizations is regarded as private action.  The problem is that these are 
not mutually exclusive categories into which all conduct can be easily placed.  
Rather, they are endpoints on a continuum.  Between purely private and 
purely governmental action is a range of mixed or hybrid activities.  For 
example, there may be government involvement in or encouragement of 
private action, which effectively transforms it into state action for purposes of 
applying constitutional restrictions.  Finding a persuasive and coherent 
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rule is deceiving.  The Court has itself acknowledged that the 
question of whether conduct is public or private “frequently 
admits of no easy answer,”9 with “the nonobvious involvement of 
the State in private conduct” often discernible only by “sifting 
facts and weighing circumstances” on a case-by-case basis.10  It 
has, nonetheless, offered some doctrinal guidance with the nexus 
and public function approaches, each providing an exception to the 
general state action rule that private actors are not subject to 
constitutional limitations. 
Under the “nexus” or “entanglement” branch, a private actor 
will be treated as a state actor if there is “significant state 
involvement” in the private activity.11  Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority12 is emblematic.  There, the Court found a 
symbiotic relationship between Eagle Coffee Shoppe and the 
Wilmington, Delaware Parking Authority.13  The restaurant, 
which refused to serve African-American customers, leased its 
property from the state, operated out of a public parking garage 
that was maintained by the state and which flew government 
flags overhead, and received a steady stream of customers who 
enjoyed convenient parking.14  The state, on the other hand, 
profited from Eagle’s discrimination by collecting rent, which 
enabled the garage to be financially self-sustaining.15  These 
interdependencies led the Court to view the state as a “joint 
participant” in Eagle’s race discrimination and, thus, to find that 
Eagle Coffee Shoppe was a state actor for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.16 
The public function theory identifies another exception to the 
general principle that private actors need not comply with 
 
method for judging those “gray areas” is the challenge of the state action 
doctrine. 
 9.  Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 172. 
 10.  Burton, 365 U.S. at 722. 
 11.  See Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190–91 (1970)); Burton, 365 U.S. 
at 725; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1948). 
 12.  Burton, 365 U.S. at 723–25. 
 13.  Id. at 725. 
 14.  Id. at 716. 
 15.  Id. at 723–24. 
 16.  Id. at 725. 
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constitutional requirements.17  Here, a private actor becomes a 
state actor if it performs a public or governmental function.18  The 
underlying rationale is that the state cannot escape the reach of 
the Constitution by delegating its functions to private actors.19  
For example, the Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright that, because 
the Democratic Party performed important electoral functions 
delegated to it by the state (in this case, the state of Texas), it was 
indeed a state actor.20  Therefore, it could not exclude African 
Americans from participating in its primary elections.21 
A notable feature of this doctrinal area is considerable change 
in the Court’s willingness to accept state action claims.  In the 
mid-twentieth century, it used the nexus and public function 
approaches to expand the notion of state action and permitted the 
Constitution to reach and restrict more and more private conduct, 
as exemplified by Burton and Smith.22  As Table 1 indicates, the 
Court found state action in all of the leading cases decided in the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.23  A dramatic change followed in the 
next two decades, with the Court developing a more restrictive 
interpretation of the public function and nexus theories and 
limiting the Constitution’s reach into the private sector.24  By 
1982, instead of a private actor needing only to perform a public 
function, the function now had to be one that was “traditionally 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946); Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944). 
 18.  See, e.g., Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502–03, 508–09 (holding that residents 
did not lose their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (in this case, the 
right to distribute religious literature on a town sidewalk) simply because the 
town was owned by a private entity). 
 19.  See, e.g., Terry, 345 U.S. at 469; Smith, 321 U.S. at 664. 
 20.  321 U.S. at 657, 664–65. 
 21.  Id. at 664. 
 22.  See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); 
Smith, 321 U.S. at 664. 
 23.  See infra Table 1. 
 24.  See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnegabo Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 201 (1989); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194–96 (1988); S.F. Arts 
& Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546–47 (1987); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–43 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 
1003 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Hudgens v. 
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976); Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 
350–51 (1974); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 119 (1973); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972); Lloyd 
Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972). 
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the exclusive prerogative of the State.”25  The bar for finding state 
action was similarly raised with respect to the nexus approach.  
Mere entanglements between the state and the private entity, 
including significant financial support, would no longer suffice.26  
Instead, the state was required to compel or coerce the private 
action.27 
 
 25.  Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353). 
 26.  See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. 
 27.  See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004–05.  An explanation of both the 
Court’s liberal expansion of state action rules and its subsequent 
conservative contraction of those rules is described briefly below on page 297-
307 of this Article and more fully in Terri Peretti, Constructing the State 
Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 298–303 (2010). 
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Table 1: Leading State Action Cases, 1940–198928 
1940s   
US v. Classic (1941) State Action  
Smith v. Allwright (1944) State Action  
Marsh v. Alabama (1946) State Action  
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) State Action  
1950s   
PUC v. Pollak (1952) State Action  
Barrows v. Jackson (1953) State Action  
Terry v. Adams (1953) State Action  
Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of Trusts (1957) State Action  
1960s   
Burton v. WPA (1961) State Action  
Peterson v. Greenville (1963) State Action  
Lombard v. Louisiana (1963) State Action  
Evans v. Newton (1966) State Action  
Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) State Action  
Amalgamated v. Logan Valley (1968) State Action  
1970s   
Evans v. Abney (1970) State Action  
Moose Lodge v. Irvis (1972)  No State Action 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972)  No State Action 
Norwood v. Harrison (1973) State Action  
CBS v. DNC (1973)  No State Action 
Gilmore v. Montgomery (1974) State Action  
Jackson v. Metro Edison (1974)  No State Action 
Hudgens v. NLRB (1976)  No State Action 
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks (1978)  No State Action 
1980s   
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil (1982) State Action  
Blum v. Yaretsky (1982)  No State Action 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn (1982)  No State Action 
S.F. Arts & Athletics v. USOC (1987)  No State Action 
NCAA v. Tarkanian (1988)  No State Action 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty DSS (1989)  No State Action 
 
 
 28.  Peretti, supra note 27, at 282 (Wiley) (“This Web site and any Wiley 
publications and material which may be accessed from it are protected by 
copyright. Nothing on this Web site or in the Wiley publications and material 
may be downloaded, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, modified, made 
available on a network, used to create derivative works, or transmitted in any  
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Blum v. Yaretsky29 effectively illustrates these changes.  The 
decision of a private nursing home to discharge or transfer 
patients without notice or the opportunity for a hearing was 
challenged as state action that violated constitutional 
requirements of due process.30  The Court rejected the argument 
that the government was a “joint participant” due to its extensive 
regulation and substantial financial support of the nursing home, 
including its reimbursement of over ninety percent of patients’ 
medical expenses.31  Furthermore, the Court observed that the 
state neither dictated nor coerced the challenged action and that 
 
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, 
scanning, or otherwise, except (i) in the United States, as permitted under 
Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, or 
internationally, as permitted by other applicable national copyright laws, or 
(ii) as expressly authorized on this Web site, or (iii) that a reasonable amount 
of material may be cached and stored by search engines indexing this Web 
site, or (iv) with the prior written permission of Wiley. Requests to the 
Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Rights & Permissions 
Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, MS 4-02, Hoboken, 
New Jersey, 07030-5774, USA or email PermissionsUS@wiley.com. The 
licenses set forth in (ii) and (iii) above may be revoked by Wiley on notice. The 
statements and opinions in the material contained on this Web site and any 
Wiley publications and material which may be accessed from this Web site 
are those of the individual contributors or advertisers, as indicated. Wiley 
has used reasonable care and skill in compiling the content of this Web site. 
However, Wiley, its employees, and content providers make no warranty as to 
the accuracy or completeness of any information on this Web site and accept 
no responsibility or liability for any inaccuracy or errors and omissions, or for 
any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the accessing or 
use of any files, software and other materials , instructions, methods or ideas 
contained on this Web site or in the Wiley publications and material accessed 
from it. Any third party Web sites which may be accessed through this Web 
site are the sole responsibility of the third party who is posting the Web site. 
Wiley makes no warranty as to the accuracy of any information on third 
party Web sites and accepts no liability for any errors and omissions or for 
any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the use or 
operation of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained on such 
Web sites. ALL DOWNLOADABLE SOFTWARE AND FILES ARE 
DISTRIBUTED ON AN ‘AS IS’ BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF ANY 
KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATIONS, 
WARRANTIES OF TITLE OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND 
DOWNLOADING AND/OR USING THE SOFTWARE AND FILES IS AT 
THE USER’S SOLE RISK.”). 
 29.  457 U.S. at 1003. 
 30.  Id. at 995–96. 
 31.  Id. at 1010–11.  
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nursing home care was not “traditionally the exclusive prerogative 
of the state.”32 
Other state action cases that were decided around this time 
period, including Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,33 Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co.,34 and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,35 illustrate the 
Court’s newly restrictive application of the public function and 
nexus approaches. As will next be discussed, these decisions and 
the higher hurdle they established for a finding of state action 
proved to be quite advantageous to the NCAA, aiding its legal 
victory in the 1988 Tarkanian case.  The NCAA was, to put it 
simply, very lucky in its timing. 
II. NCAA V. TARKANIAN 
The NCAA is a private, non-profit association founded in 1906 
to establish uniform rules for intercollegiate sports.36  Its creation 
was in response to growing concerns—including those voiced by 
President Theodore Roosevelt—over violence and player injuries 
in college football.37  Today, the NCAA consists of almost 1,300 
members, including nearly every four-year public and private 
American university and college with a major athletic program.38  
In 2013, it earned revenues of over $900 million with net assets of 
 
 32.  Id. at 1011–12 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 353 
(1974)).  
 33.  419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that there was not a sufficient nexus 
between the state and a privately owned and operated utility company that 
had been issued a public certificate of convenience, giving it a partial 
monopoly to render its actions as state actions). 
 34.  457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that a statutory system that allowed 
state officials to attach privately owned property based on one party’s ex 
parte application displayed a sufficient nexus to render the attachment as a 
state action). 
 35.  457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private school performing a 
traditionally public function was not a state actor solely based on the receipt 
of public funds since the school was not compelled by state regulations). 
 36.  See JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY iii 
(2006); Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Assocation’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 9, 12 (2000). 
 37.  See Smith, supra note 36, at 11–12. 
 38.  See, e.g.,  Turner introduce new NCAA.com, NCAA (Oct. 31, 2013, 
12:37 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2013-10-31/ncaaturner-
introduce-new-ncaacom.  In 1988, when the Supreme Court decided NCAA v. 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988), the Association only consisted of 960 
member universities and colleges. 
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over $625 million, and its workforce currently consists of 500 
employees.39  As the primary governing body for college sports, 
the NCAA has developed a complex set of rules that regulate 
recruiting and financial aid relating to college athletes.40  Most of 
these rules are designed to enforce “the amateur code” and 
preserve the “student-athlete” concept, which has protected the 
NCAA against workmen’s compensation claims by college athletes 
and which most experts regard as an antitrust violation.41  The 
NCAA’s rules gained authority as the Association’s economic 
power grew, primarily due to its role in securing lucrative 
television contracts which has transformed it into “the gatekeeper 
 
 39.  See Mark Alesia, NCAA approaching $1 billion per year amid 
challenges by players, INDY STAR (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:06 PM), http://www 
.indystar.com/story/news/2014/03/27/ncaa-approaching-billion-per-year-amid-
challenges-players/6973767/. 
 40.  See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL arts. 13, 15, at 87–
145, 187–209 (2014), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ 
productdownloads/D115.pdf [hereinafter D-1 MANUAL]. 
 41.  See Jason Belzer, Op-Ed., Leveling The Playing Field: Student 
Athletes Or Employee Athletes?, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 2:00 P.M.), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2013/09/09/leveling-the-playing-field-
student-athletes-or-employee-athletes/; see also D-1 MANUAL, supra note 40, 
art. 12, at 57–86.  The NCAA asserts that its “membership has adopted 
amateurism rules to ensure the students’ priority remains on obtaining a 
quality educational experience and that all of student-athletes are competing 
equitably.”  Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015); see also D-1 MANUAL, supra note 40, art. 2.9, at 4.  It is 
well known, however, that the “student-athlete” term was adopted to protect 
the NCAA and universities from workmen’s compensation claims for injured 
football players.  See, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 A.M.), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/?single_page=true.  A 
variety of antitrust experts and sports economists believe that this agreement 
among member institutions to limit compensation for college athletes violates 
antitrust laws, thereby transforming the NCAA into a cartel.  See generally 
ARTHUR A. FLEISCHER ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR (1992); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, 
UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
SPORTS (1999); see also Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Ann M. Mayo, Issues in 
Antitrust, the NCAA, and Sports Management, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 69, 77–
78 (1999); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 
TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2643 (1996); Stanton Wheeler, Rethinking Amateurism 
and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213, 226 (2004); Roger G. Noll, The 
Antitrust Economics of NCAA Restrictions on Athletic Scholarships 4, 7 (Aug. 
31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://winthrop 
ntelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Noll-Report-NCAA-The-Antitrus
t-Economics-of-NCAA-Restrictions-on-Athletic-Scholarships.pdf.  
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of . . . the ‘entertainment Goliath.’”42 The process by which the 
NCAA asserts its authority is indirect, however. Member 
institutions do not grant the NCAA authority over their athletic 
programs, but they do agree to follow and enforce NCAA rules.43  
Thus, it is the school rather than the NCAA that takes 
disciplinary action against athletes and the athletic program staff.  
As previously mentioned, those sanctions can have devastating 
consequences: a coach may be denied his or her position and 
livelihood, and a college athlete may lose his or her eligibility, a 
subsidized college education, and the opportunity for a lucrative 
career in professional sports.  Fighting those sanctions can also be 
an exhausting and costly endeavor.44 
The dominant view in the lower federal courts in the 1970s 
was that the NCAA45 and high school athletic associations46 were 
state actors.  Judges typically observed that public institutions 
comprised a large portion of the association’s membership, the 
association’s regulatory control was extensive, and school 
compliance with association recommendations was more coercive 
than voluntary.47  As a result of these decisions, the NCAA and 
equivalent associations at the high school level would need to 
observe constitutional requirements like due process when 
 
 42.  Kadence A. Otto & Kristal S. Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The 
Entwinement and Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and 
Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 243, 288 (2008) (quoting 
JOHN R. GERDY, THE SUCCESSFUL COLLEGE ATHLETIC PROGRAM 31, 55 (1997)). 
 43.  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988). 
 44.  See, e.g., Phil Fairbanks, Judge rejects suit by former UB coach, 
BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013, 7:46 P.M), http://www.buffalo 
news.com/20130322/judge_rejects_suit_by_former_ub_coach.html (describing 
SUNY Buffalo basketball coach Tim Cohane’s ten year legal fight with the 
NCAA); Rachel George, Many taking the fight to the NCAA these days, USA 
TODAY SPORTS (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:58 P.M.), http://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/04/25/ncaa-lawsuits-jerry-tarkanian-todd-
mcnair/2114469/ (detailing that Jerry Tarkanian’s twenty year battle with 
the NCAA cost millions, although he was eventually awarded $2.5 million in 
legal fees). 
 45.  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th 
Cir. 1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. 
NCAA , 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 
493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 46.  See, e.g., Wright v. Ark. Activities Ass’n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974); 
La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224 (5th 
Cir. 1968). 
 47.  See supra notes 45–46. 
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imposing sanctions against athletes, coaches, or schools. 
This consensus was upended by 1982’s so-called “Blum 
trilogy,” a set of three decisions decided on the same day that 
established more restrictive state action rules.48  Following these 
new rules, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the claim of a Duke University tennis player that 
the NCAA’s decision ruling him ineligible was state action and 
held that the NCAA’s action was not reviewable in federal court.49  
Following the Supreme Court’s doctrinal lead, the court ruled that 
there is no state action when “the state in its regulatory or 
subsidizing function does not order or cause the action complained 
of” and noted that the public function of regulating collegiate 
athletics “is not one traditionally reserved to the state.”50  Other 
federal courts in the 1980s, with rare exceptions,51 similarly ruled 
that the NCAA was not a state actor.52  Surprisingly, however, 
courts continued to rule that high school athletic associations were 
state actors.53 
This divergence in judicial treatment of the NCAA and high 
school athletic associations currently exists at the Supreme Court 
level as well.  In 1988, the Court found that the NCAA was not a 
state actor, but in 2001 the Court ruled that the Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Association was a state actor.54  As will 
be discussed shortly, the Court’s reasoning in the latter case 
provides an opening for reformers seeking to subject the NCAA’s 
policies and activities to judicial review.  The primary obstacle 
standing in the way of this goal is NCAA v. Tarkanian, to which 
this Article now turns. 
 
 48.  See Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 247.  The 1982 “Blum trilogy” 
consists of  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 
(1982).   
 49.  Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021–22 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 50.  Id. at 1022. 
 51.  See, e.g., McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
 52.  See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 
953 (6th Cir. 1986); Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1984); Hawkins v. 
NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987). 
 53.  See e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 
1982); Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 54.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 290–91 (2001); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988).  
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The NCAA began investigating Jerry Tarkanian while he was 
a basketball coach at California State University, Long Beach, 
nearly two decades before the Supreme Court’s 1988 ruling.55  It 
continued to scrutinize Tarkanian after his arrival at the 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas (“UNLV”) in 1973, which was 
already the subject of an NCAA investigation.56  Many 
commentators agree that “the NCAA’s dogged pursuit of Jerry 
Tarkanian appears to have been driven at least as much by 
personal animus as by evidence against him or his players.”57  The 
NCAA ultimately charged UNLV with thirty-eight rule violations 
involving  recruiting and providing aid and benefits to players; ten 
of those violations implicated Coach Tarkanian.58  The NCAA 
placed UNLV on probation for two years and, in an unusual move, 
also asked UNLV to show cause as to why it should not face 
additional penalties if it failed to suspend Tarkanian from its 
program.59  UNLV President Donald Baepler ordered an internal 
investigation which concluded that the NCAA’s charges lacked 
merit.  He nonetheless concluded that his institution could neither 
withdraw from the NCAA nor risk additional sanctions, and he 
reluctantly ordered the coach’s two-year suspension.60 
Jerry Tarkanian sued the University, with the complaint later 
being amended to include the NCAA.61  A Nevada trial court and 
the Nevada Supreme Court both ruled in Tarkanian’s favor, 
finding that the NCAA’s conduct was state action and that due 
process guarantees had not been observed.62  The Nevada 
Supreme Court reasoned that disciplining government employees 
 
 55.  See BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA 111 (2012). 
 56.  See id. 
 57.  Id. at 114; accord JERRY TARKANIAN & DAN WETZEL, RUNNIN’ REBEL 
(2005); DON YEAGER, SHARK ATTACK: JERRY TARKANIAN AND HIS BATTLE WITH 
THE NCAA AND UNLV (1992).  Tarkanian’s harsh criticism of the NCAA, 
mostly for the selective enforcement of its recruiting rules, likely triggered 
the organization’s lengthy battle with the coach.  See James Potter, 
Comment, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and Due 
Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1269, 1282 (2007). 
 58.  See Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Nev. 1987), overruled 
by Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179. 
 59.  See id; see also PORTO, supra note 55, at 115. 
 60.  See Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1347; see also Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 
594 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 1979). 
 61.  Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1347. 
 62.  Id. at 1349–51. 
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was traditionally an exclusive prerogative of the state and that 
the University’s delegation of such authority to the NCAA and the 
University’s implementation of the NCAA’s recommended 
sanctions rendered the two institutions joint participants in the 
suspension.63  The procedures employed by the NCAA were 
furthermore found to be deficient in several respects when it came 
to due process, including the failure of enforcement staff to 
provide written affidavits from interviewees.64 
The NCAA appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari—though just barely.65  The preliminary pool 
memorandum did not in fact regard the case as “worthy of cert”66  
and found the state action issue to be “troubling in several 
respects.”67  First, the memorandum observed that there was no 
split in the lower courts, with recent circuit court decisions in 
agreement that the NCAA was not a state actor.68  The law clerk 
authoring the pool memorandum additionally argued that the 
Nevada Supreme Court decision seemed to contradict, and in fact 
failed to acknowledge, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee that 
the U.S. Olympic Committee was not a state actor since “the 
coordination of amateur sports has [not] been a traditional 
governmental function.”69  Finally, the memorandum observed 
that the state action issue presented oddly in the case.70  Instead 
of the typical inquiry as to whether the state compelled the 
private action, the question in Tarkanian was whether the private 
actor (the NCAA) compelled the state (UNLV) to act against its 
employee (Tarkanian)—thereby assuming the state-actor mantle.  
The pool memorandum thus recommended denial of the certiorari 
petition and offered several alternatives, including remand for 
 
 63.  Id. at 1348–49.  
 64.  Id. at 1350. 
 65.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988). 
 66.  Preliminary Pool Memorandum, U.S. Supreme Court on Univ. of 
Nevada v. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987) (No. 87-1061) 8 (Feb. 19, 1988), 
available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM-
1988-pdf/87-1061.pdf [hereinafter Tarkanian Pool Memo].   
 67.  Id. at 7. 
 68.  Id. at 6. 
 69.  483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987); Tarkanian Pool Memo, supra note 66, at 6. 
 70.  Tarkanian Pool Memo, supra note 66, at 8. 
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reconsideration in light of San Francisco Arts.71  The Court 
nonetheless chose to accept the case for review, with only four 
Justices voting to grant certiorari.72  Those votes, however, 
provided no hint of the likely outcome on the merits.  Two of the 
four Justices choosing to grant review—Rehnquist and Stevens—
would later vote to reverse the Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling, 
while the other two Justices—White and O’Connor—would vote to 
affirm. 
In 1988, in a close 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the NCAA was not a state actor.73  The majority opinion by 
Justice Stevens emphasized that the NCAA was a private 
organization whose national membership was independent of any 
particular state and, thus, whose policies could not be 
characterized as a product of Nevada law.74  The Court 
additionally ruled that promoting and administering college 
athletics was not a “traditional” or “exclusive” state function and 
that, while the NCAA could sanction UNLV, the NCAA could not 
and did not perform the state’s function of disciplining public 
employees.75  The majority opinion also disputed the claim that 
UNLV had no choice but to comply with the NCAA’s 
recommendations.76  It asserted that UNLV could have refused to 
suspend Tarkanian, withdrawn from the NCAA, or fought as an 
NCAA member to improve the Association’s rules and processes.77  
Finally, the majority thought it critically important that, unlike 
the relationship between Eagle Coffee Shoppe and Wilmington 
Parking Authority, the NCAA and UNLV were “antagonists, not 
joint participants” throughout the proceedings.78 
In his dissent, Justice White came to a starkly different 
conclusion, finding that the NCAA “acted jointly” with UNLV in 
 
 71.  Id. at 8, 9.  Ultimately, the pool memorandum advised against both 
summary reversal or remand, despite concerns regarding the Nevada 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the state action issue.  Id.  The law clerk 
authoring the memorandum instead regarded “the best course” as waiting for 
other courts to decide the issue to see if a split between the circuits 
developed.  Id. at 9. 
 72.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988) (mem.). 
 73.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). 
 74.  Id. at 193. 
 75.  Id. at 197 n.18. 
 76.  Id. at 198–99. 
 77.  Id. at 198. 
 78.  Id. at 196 n.16. 
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suspending Tarkanian.79  This followed obviously and logically, he 
argued, from the fact that “it was the NCAA’s findings that 
Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted 
hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its membership 
agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian’s 
suspension by UNLV.”80  In response to the majority’s claim that 
UNLV retained other choices, including withdrawing from the 
NCAA, White responded that the most important fact was that 
the University did not choose those options, but instead suspended 
Tarkanian.81  White also observed that, while UNLV and the 
NCAA may have acted as adversaries throughout the proceedings, 
the bottom line, “as with any conspiracy, is that ultimately the 
parties agreed to take the action.”82 
One very interesting feature of the Tarkanian decision was 
the unusual composition of the majority and minority coalitions.  
The narrow five-member majority in Tarkanian consisted of 
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, while the dissenters included Justices White, Brennan, 
Marshall, and O’Connor.83  As University of California, Davis Law 
Professor Vikram Amar observes, this particular 5-4 line-up was 
unique, never appearing in any of the other 350 cases in which 
these nine Justices participated together.84  Table 2 offers 
additional support, using Martin-Quinn measures of Supreme 
Court ideology to demonstrate that the Justices’ votes were not 
ideologically ordered;85 the majority consisted of Justices ranked 
first (i.e., most conservative), second, fourth, sixth, and seventh, 
while the dissenters were ranked third, fifth, eighth and ninth.  
Had the votes been ideologically-ordered, a 5-4 ruling would have 
 
 79.  Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting). 
 80.  Id. at 203. 
 81.  Id. at 202, 203. 
 82.  Id. at 203. 
 83.  Id. at 180 (majority opinion). 
 84.  Vikram David Amar, The NCAA as Regulator, Litigant, and State 
Actor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 415, 431 (2011). 
 85.  Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Measures, MARTIN-QUINN 
SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php (last visited Jan. 21, 
2015).  Martin and Quinn employ a Bayesian model to generate ideal point 
estimates for each Justice that are dynamic, i.e., varying for each term, and 
which are derived from the Justices’ actual votes and inferred from the 
patterns of voting coalitions.  
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seen Justices O’Connor and White voting with the majority and 
Justices Stevens and Blackmun with the dissent.  Justice White’s 
deviation from ideological expectations is often explained by the 
fact that he was “Whizzer White,” a former college athlete who 
understood the real power of the NCAA.86 
 









1 Rehnquist  
2 Scalia  
3  O’Connor 
4 Kennedy  
5  White 
6 Stevens  
7 Blackmun  
8  Brennan 
9  Marshall 
 
III. WHY TARKANIAN SHOULD BE REVERSED 
Scholarly reaction to the Supreme Court’s Tarkanian decision 
has been overwhelmingly and properly negative.88  The Court’s 
 
 86.  See PORTO, supra note 55, at 134–35; see also DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, 
THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. 
WHITE 43–45 (1998). 
 87.  Martin & Quinn, supra note 85. 
 88. See, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a 
Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS L. 1 (2000); Betty Chang, Coercion 
Theory and the State Action Doctrine as Applied in NCAA v. Tarkanian and 
NCAA v. Miller, 22 J.C. & U.L. 133 (1995); Kevin M. McKenna, The 
Tarkanian Decision: The State of College Athletics is Everything But State 
Action, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 459 (1990); Otto & Stippich, supra note 42; John P. 
Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What’s Left After National 
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, __ U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 454 
(1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621 (1989); Robin J. Green, Note, Does the NCAA 
Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis of NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42 
DUKE L.J. 99 (1992); Bill McManus, Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian:  May a 
Student-Athlete Receive Constitutional Protection from the NCAA’s Actions or 
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adoption in the 1970s and 1980s of an increasingly formalistic and 
crabbed approach to state action questions led it in Tarkanian to 
ignore functional considerations in its state action analysis and 
downplay compelling evidence of interdependence between the 
NCAA and the state.  Both factors should have led to a finding 
that the NCAA’s action with respect to Coach Tarkanian was 
indeed state action. 
As previously noted, the Court significantly eroded its state 
action rules during the mid-twentieth century, enabling the 
Constitution to reach and restrict more and more private 
activities, mostly in the area of race discrimination. Its primary 
tool for doing so was the flexible, “totality-of-the-circumstances” 
approach established in Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority.89  The Court explicitly rejected the idea that a simple 
formula could be constructed in order to find state action.90  
Instead, it claimed that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in 
private conduct be attributed its true significance.”91  This case-
by-case and fact-based approach might be seen as a failure by the 
Court to develop clear and precise doctrinal rules; to some, 
however, it was an appropriate response to “the increasingly 
malleable nature of public and private.”92  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the Rehnquist Court turned away from this totality-of-the-
circumstances approach and returned to a “‘rule-oriented’ 
approach to state action analysis.”93  It “restored the doctrine’s 
 
has the Final Door Been Closed?, 57 UMKC L. REV. 949 (1989); Potter, supra 
note 57; Jose R. Riguera, Case Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian: The State Action 
Doctrine Faces a Half-Court Press, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 197 (1989); Branden 
Tedesco, Comment, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian:  A 
Death Knell for the Symbiotic Relationship Test?, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
237 (1990); Stephen R. Van Camp, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Tarkanian: Viewing State Action Through the Analytical Looking Glass, 92 
W. VA. L. REV. 761 (1989); Susan Westover, Note, National Collegiate Athletic 
Association v. Takanian: If NCAA Action is Not State Action, Can its 
Members Meaningfully Air Their Dissatisfaction?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 
(1989). 
 89.  365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961).  
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 722. 
 92.  State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1248, 1254 (2010) [hereinafter Harvard State Action]. 
 93.  Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of 
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1391 (2005). 
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formalist underpinnings,” which were firmly embraced in 1982 by 
the Blum trilogy of cases.94  The modern Court’s strict, rule-bound 
approach to state action, however, inhibits its ability to recognize 
and appreciate the potentially varied, unusual, and cumulative 
impacts of state and private entanglements.  As evidence, 
remember that the Court almost did not accept the Tarkanian 
case for review because of the unusual framing of the state action 
question.  The coach’s suspension was actually ordered by the 
University, itself a state actor.95  The question in the case, thus, 
became “whether UNLV’s actions in compliance with the NCAA 
rules and recommendations turned the NCAA’s conduct into state 
action.”96  The Court’s opinion in Tarkanian took explicit notice 
that the case “uniquely mirror[ed] the traditional state-action 
case” and required the Court “to step through an analytical 
looking glass to resolve the case.”97  Clearly, the Court’s formalism 
challenged its ability to adapt to an unusual set of facts, a blind 
spot that would not have emerged under Burton’s totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.98 
Professor Amar has similarly criticized the Court for its rigid 
and misguided search for the abstract quality of “stateness.”99  His 
improved “function over form” approach invites the Court to 
explore potential functional reasons for either extending or 
restricting the Constitution’s reach. For example, a state action 
claim might be denied for reasons relating to privacy, separation 
of powers, or federalism.100  However, as Amar points out, these 
functional justifications are not compelling when it comes to the 
NCAA.101  A privacy rationale for rejecting state-action status, for 
instance, fails because the NCAA is not an intimate or expressive 
association that deserves autonomy from constitutional or 
governmental regulations.102  Nor does ruling that the NCAA is a 
 
 94.  Harvard State Action, supra note 92, at 1251. 
 95.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988). 
 96.  Id. at 193.  
 97.  Id. at 192, 193. 
 98.  See Riguera, supra note 88, at 225, 226 n.193; see also Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961) (describing the 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach). 
 99.  Amar, supra note 84, at 416, 417–18. 
 100.  Id. at 425. 
 101.  Id. at 433–37. 
 102.  Id. at 437. 
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private actor appropriately leave Congress, rather than courts, in 
charge of crafting fair procedures for resolving disputes; thus, a 
separation-of-powers rationale also fails.103  Finally, Amar argues, 
there is no compelling federalism-based reason to reject the 
argument that the NCAA is a state actor.104  It makes little sense 
to preserve the option of diverse state and local regulation for a 
national association that designs and enforces uniform rules for 
college athletics.105  The Supreme Court has, in any case, 
precluded that option.  Several states, including Florida, Illinois, 
Nebraska, and Nevada, responded to Tarkanian by enacting laws 
that imposed procedural requirements on NCAA investigations 
and enforcement proceedings.106  The Court, however, refused to 
review and left intact a Ninth Circuit decision holding that these 
regulatory efforts ran afoul of the Constitution by unduly 
burdening interstate commerce.107 
Professor Amar is correct that the Court’s rigid approach to 
state action deterred it in Tarkanian from exploring functional 
reasons for accepting or rejecting the state action claim.  Even 
more significantly, in my view, the Court’s formalism blinded it to 
the considerable evidence of interdependence between the NCAA 
and the state.108  There is a broad array of entanglements and 
mutually shared benefits between the two parties, which had led 
the Court to find state action in previous cases like Burton.109  
First, through its coordination and regulatory role, the NCAA 
enables intercollegiate athletic competition which “generates 
revenue, visibility and prestige” for its member institutions.110  
The NCAA, which is based in Indianapolis, furthermore enjoys 
tax-exempt status and a significant taxpayer subsidy in the form 
of $1.00 annual rent in its long-term lease agreement with the 
 
 103.  Id. at 434–37. 
 104.  Id. at 433. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 240.5339  – .5349 (West 1992); 105 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 25/1–13 (LexisNexis 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-1202(7) (1992); 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 398.155 – .255 (1991). 
 107.  See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
511 U.S. 1033 (1994). 
 108.  See Potter, supra note 57, at 1286; see also Tedesco, supra note 88, at 
237–38, 252, 255–56. 
 109.  See Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 247–48. 
 110.  Id. at 277. 
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Indiana White River State Park Development Commission.111  
Additionally, state and local funding supported the construction of 
its new facility in Indianapolis in the 1990s.112  While there are 
numerically more private than public school members in the 
NCAA, public schools “dominate the funding, management and 
control of the NCAA,” mostly because of their powerful presence in 
Division I.113  NCAA regulations, in addition, cover a broad range 
of activities at public universities and colleges, including 
“recruit[ment of athletes], post-season and regular-season 
[athletic] competition, academic credentials, eligibility for 
financial aid . . . and promotion[]” of athletic events.114  For their 
part, state schools devote considerable resources to recruit 
athletes; fund, train, and promote athletic teams; pay coaches who 
are often the most highly paid public employees in the state; and 
construct and maintain stadiums and other athletic facilities.115  
Another sizable state expense comes in the form of legal fees spent 
by public institutions to defend themselves against alleged NCAA 
infractions, with major violations far more likely to be imposed 
against public compared to private institutions.116  This sizable 
investment is necessitated by the enormous costs of NCAA 
sanctions, particularly bans on post-season play.117  It is these 
huge financial stakes that “make it exceedingly difficult for a 
public school to honor [its] constitutional obligations when they 
conflict with the NCAA’s sanctions.”118  Finally, the NCAA is 
exerting more and more influence on high school athletics and 
youth sports.119  This extensive and varied evidence creates a 
powerful case that the NCAA and the state enjoy a symbiotic 
relationship which, under a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach like that employed in Burton, renders the NCAA a state 
 
 111.  See id. at 276–77. 
 112.  See id. at 277. 
 113.  Id. at 279–82. 
 114.  Id. at 282. 
 115.  See id. at 286–88. 
 116.  See id. at 285, 286; see also id. at 285 (“An analysis of the NCAA 
institutions (entire membership [Divisions I, II and III]) with the most major 
infractions (1953-present) [total of 269 infractions] revealed that 180(67%) 
are public and 89(33%) are private.” (first alteration in original)). 
 117.  See id. at 288–89. 
 118.  Id. at 289. 
 119.  Id. at 283–85. 
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actor.  In any case, since 1988 there has been considerable change 
in the NCAA’s structure and financial status, suggesting that 
courts need to provide an updated, fact-based assessment of 
whether the NCAA is a state actor, instead of their private status 
being “frozen in time” by Tarkanian.120 
The Tarkanian Court’s formalistic blinders are also 
responsible for its failure to acknowledge UNLV’s subservience to 
NCAA power.  The majority opinion emphasized that UNLV 
retained alternatives to following the NCAA’s recommended 
sanctions, such as continuing to employ Tarkanian as coach or 
withdrawing from the NCAA entirely.121  The Court, furthermore, 
placed great weight on the fact that UNLV and the NCAA were 
antagonists throughout the lengthy investigatory and enforcement 
process, claiming that this proved that they could not be 
considered joint participants in Tarkanian’s suspension.122  
However, the critical fact is that UNLV did choose to suspend the 
coach and did so in spite of being convinced that the charges were 
false.123  The fact that the University fired its coach, despite its 
considerable opposition, constitutes powerful evidence that UNLV 
had indeed delegated its authority to the NCAA and that the 
NCAA was the master, not the servant.124  UNLV was not able, as 
a practical matter, to defy or leave the NCAA because, “in the 
world of intercollegiate athletics, there is but one well-kept 
playing field open to colleges and universities, private or public, 
and the NCAA is the groundskeeper.”125  “[T]he NCAA is, in 
effect, a ‘private monopolist’ in the realm of intercollegiate 
athletics.”126 
To summarize, there are no compelling functional reasons to 
 
 120.  See generally Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action 
Doctrine’s Application to Amateur Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183 (2008). 
 121.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988). 
 122.  Id. at 196 n.16. 
 123.  See James L. Arslanian, Comment, The NCAA and State Action: 
Does the Creature Control Its Master?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L.  333, 342–43 (1990); 
Tedesco, supra note 88, at 246.  
 124.  See Arslanian, supra note 123, at 347–48, 351. 
 125.  Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic 
Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 101, 127 (1984). 
 126.  Ronald J. Thompson, Comment, Due Process and the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any Constitutional Standards?, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1651, 1664 (1994) (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198); accord 
Greene, supra note 125, at 135–36. 
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protect the NCAA from being considered a state actor; there are 
numerous interdependencies between the state and the NCAA; 
and UNLV appears to have delegated its authority to the NCAA.  
The Court was, thus, incorrect in its 1988 Tarkanian ruling that 
the NCAA is not a state actor. 
IV. FROM “HERE TO THERE:”  DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
These weaknesses in the Court’s reasoning have been 
amplified by the “unsustainable dichotomy”127 between the 
Court’s Tarkanian ruling that the NCAA is not a state actor and 
the Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association128 decision that a Tennessee high school athletic 
association is a state actor.  Not only was the outcome different in 
Brentwood Academy, the Court there employed a much more 
flexible and fact-based approach.129  This actually offers a path 
and a rather short doctrinal step for the reversal of NCAA v. 
Tarkanian. 
The Brentwood Academy case began when the Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”) charged the 
Brentwood Academy (the “Academy”), a private Christian high 
school, with violating recruiting rules and placed it on athletic 
probation for four years, banned its football and basketball teams 
from the playoffs for two years, and imposed a fine of $3,000.130  
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that these were state actions 
requiring the observance of due process safeguards because of “the 
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in 
[the Association’s] composition and workings.”131  In support, the 
majority noted that eighty-four percent of the Association 
members were public high schools; public school officials 
dominated the governing council and control board; members of 
the State Board of Education sat ex officio on the Association’s 
governing bodies; and Association employees were permitted to 
 
 127.  See Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 245. 
 128.  531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 129.  Compare Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (holding that the NCAA is not a 
state actor when enforcing its recruiting rules and causing the UNLV men’s 
basketball coach to be fired), with Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. 288 (holding 
that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was a state actor 
when attempting to enforce a rule against a member school). 
 130.  Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 293. 
 131.  Id. at 291. 
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join the state retirement system.132  Furthermore, every voting 
member of the governing board that imposed penalties against 
Brentwood Academy was a public school administrator.133  
Interestingly, the Court claimed that the result in Brentwood was 
“foreshadow[ed]” by Tarkanian,134 which had held that the 
NCAA’s actions could not be fairly attributed to the state of 
Nevada given the NCAA’s multi-state membership, but that it 
might be different if its members, many of them public 
institutions, were located within a single state.135  Perhaps it was 
this distinction that prompted Justice Stevens to switch his vote 
from Tarkanian and find state action in the Brentwood case. 
Justice Thomas’s dissent criticized the majority for 
introducing a new and uncertain state action standard, relying on 
“mere ‘entwinement’” without requiring additional evidence of the 
state’s joint participation, encouragement, or coercion.136  In a 
particularly astute footnote, he further criticized the Court’s 
reference to Tarkanian as 
ironic because it is not difficult to imagine that 
application of the majority’s entwinement test could 
change the result reached in that case, so that the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s actions could be 
found to be state action given its large number of public 
institution members that virtually control the 
organization.137 
Many commentators find the Brentwood Academy case 
notable, first, for the majority’s use of the “entwinement” language 
and, second, for its surprisingly flexible approach to the state 
action issue.138  As the dissenters correctly point out, the majority 
seemed to have backed away from the Court’s requirement of 
 
 132.  Id. at 291–92, 300.  
 133.  Id. at 293.  
 134.  Id. at 297. 
 135.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988). 
 136.  Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 137.  Id. at 314 n.7.   
 138.  See, e.g., Otto & Stippich supra note 42, at 270–72.  This Article 
views the Court’s approach in Brentwood as a move toward a more flexible 
fact-based approach.  See also Potter, supra note 57, at 1290–94 (focusing on 
the “entwinement” analysis embraced over previously established criteria for 
determining what constitutes state action in Brentwood).   
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encouragement or coercion, which emerged from restrictive state 
action rulings like Jackson, Blum, and Rendell-Baker.139  The 
entwinement language in Brentwood, which had not been 
employed since the 1966 Evans v. Newton case,140 has sparked 
considerable speculation about whether it “marked a return to an 
old theory of state action or the adoption of a new one.”141  
Uncertainty regarding its significance in the state action field 
remains. 
A second noteworthy development in Brentwood is the 
reemergence of a more practical and flexible approach to the state 
action issue, compared to the rigid formalism the Court has 
demonstrated over the last few decades.  In Brentwood, Justice 
Souter’s majority opinion explicitly noted that “[w]hat is fairly 
attributable [to the state] is a matter of normative judgment, and 
the criteria lack rigid simplicity.”142  State action is, thus, a 
“necessarily fact-bound inquiry.”143  Furthermore, with regard to 
Brentwood Academy, there is “no offsetting reason to see the 
association’s acts in any other way” (i.e., other than as state 
action) and “no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying 
constitutional standards to it.”144  Another indicator of flexibility 
is the Court’s treatment of the Tennessee Board of Education’s 
decision to drop its 1972 rule expressly designating the 
Association as “the organization to supervise and regulate the 
athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high 
 
 139.  See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 309–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).  These 
cases all strengthened the requirements for finding state action, requiring for 
example that the action was traditionally an exclusive state function or was 
coerced by the state.  Id.   
 140.  382 U.S. 296, 299, 301 (1966) (holding that a private park was 
municipal in character and, thus, could not discriminate based on race under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly where the city had previously been 
significantly entwined in its management). 
 141.  Porto, supra note 55, at 160 (discussing the uncertainty generated by 
the Brentwood entwinement concept as it relates to earlier nexus and joint 
participant theories of state action and its failure to make headway in 
overturning  Tarkanian); see also Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291, 297, 300, 302; 
Evans, 382 U.S. at 299, 301.  
 142.  Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295. 
 143.  Id. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 
(1982)).  
 144.  Id. at 291, 298. 
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schools in Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis.”145  
The Court chose to look “not to form but to an underlying reality,” 
sensing that “the Association’s official character” continued to 
exist, even though “by winks and nods.”146 
A final observation regarding the Brentwood decision is that, 
unlike in Tarkanian, the Justices’ votes were perfectly ordered 
ideologically.  As seen in Table 3, the majority consisted of the five 
least conservative Justices—Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, 
and O’Connor.  The four dissenters were the most conservative 
Justices—Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.  This 
information suggests an ideology-based strategy for reformers 
seeking to reverse Tarkanian: target the Court’s ideologically-
median Justice and pay close attention to the ideological location 
of new appointees. 
Table 3: Ideological Disorder in Brentwood Academy v. 










1  Thomas 
2  Scalia 
3  Rehnquist 
4  Kennedy 
5 O’Connor  
6 Souter  
7 Breyer  
8 Ginsburg  
9 Stevens  
 
Brentwood Academy and its corresponding scholarly 
commentary make clear that reversing Tarkanian would not 
require the Court to invent a new doctrine or discard an entire 
line of precedents and doctrinal rules.  Instead, it would only need 
 
 145.  Id. at 292–93, 300–01. 
 146.  Id. at 301 & n.4. 
 147.  Martin & Quinn, supra note 85. 
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to “look afresh at the NCAA, and do so in light of the Brentwood 
approach,”148 seeing behind the “winks and nods” which are so 
abundant “in the amateur sports context.”149  To clarify: 
Given that the purpose, structure, and operations of the 
NCAA and high school athletic associations are similar, 
and public school members are critically involved in both 
associations, there is no convincing basis to distinguish 
between high school athletic associations and the NCAA 
for state actor purposes.  If anything, by highlighting the 
nature of the relationship between the public high schools 
and the TSSAA, emphasizing the money that schools 
spend on competition, their need for the association, how 
the association’s functions are so dependent upon public 
education and the interdependence on each other, 
Brentwood leads the way for a finding that the NCAA, 
too, should be a state actor.150 
Although reversing Tarkanian may require only a small 
doctrinal step, the nudge for the Court to take that step must be 
political.  That is the argument that Part V seeks to develop. 
V. FROM “HERE TO THERE:”  POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Effective critiques and a new doctrinal path laid out in 
scholarly articles may be necessary conditions for constitutional 
change, but they are certainly not sufficient conditions.  
Constitutional change requires a political impetus and, typically, a 
strong commitment by the dominant partisan regime.  As 
discussed below, this has been demonstrated in a variety of areas 
of the law, including reapportionment, the Second Amendment, 
and state action itself.  To be successful, any reform movement to 
subject the NCAA to judicial oversight must understand and 
observe this lesson. 
 
 148.  Potter, supra note 57, at 1294 (arguing that, in order to rein in the 
NCAA, a more flexible approach, already adopted by the Court, must be 
applied). 
 149.  Koller, supra note 120, at 203 (noting that the Court’s refusal in 
Brentwood to ignore the state’s action through the TSSAA, even though not 
as overt as it was in the past, could hold serious implications in the world of 
amateur sports where the same pattern is so common).  
 150.  Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 274. 
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A.  Reapportionment.  
In 1962, the Supreme Court entered what Justice Frankfurter 
called “the political thicket” of reapportionment.151  It ruled in 
Baker v. Carr that the severe malapportionment existing in the 
House of Representatives and virtually every state legislature—
typically overrepresentation of rural residents and 
underrepresentation of urban residents—was a justiciable issue 
that could be addressed by federal courts.152  With this green 
light, federal court judges began entertaining and deciding 
constitutional challenges to malapportioned legislative bodies.  
Within two years, the Court imposed a strict one person-one vote 
equality standard on the U.S. House of Representatives and every 
state legislative chamber.153  Remarkably, by 1970 all states had 
complied with the Court’s new equal population standard in its 
congressional districts and in both state houses, and 
representational equality dramatically improved.154 
 
 151.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“In effect, today’s decision empowers the courts of the country to 
devise what should constitute the proper composition of the legislatures of 
the fifty states.”); see also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) 
(dismissing a suit by Illinois voters seeking a declaration that an Illinois 
statute apportioning congressional districts resulted in unequal 
representation of their districts and was, therefore, unconstitutional, Justice 
Frankfurter advised that “Courts ought not enter this political thicket”). 
 152.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–10; see also STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES 
M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (2008) (recognizing that in 1960, 
the most overrepresented county in a typical state enjoyed thirty-five times 
as much representation as the underrepresented county); see also Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy: 
Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 390–91 
(1988) (“In the 88th Congress (1962) only nine districts were within 1 percent 
of the average size in their states.”). 
 153.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 577 (1964) (“By holding that 
as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be 
apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that a state make an honest and good faith effort to construct 
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is 
practicable.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–9, 18 (1964) (“While it may 
not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, 
that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making 
equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal of the 
House of Representatives.”). 
 154.  See James B. Cottrill & Terri J. Peretti, Gerrymandering from the 
Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting, 12 ELECTION L. 
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While the Court is typically and understandably praised for 
advancing democratic values with these extraordinary decisions, 
the motivation behind them was largely partisan.155  As I have 
argued elsewhere, it was not the Court’s desire to promote equal 
representation that explains why the Baker ruling materialized in 
1962 instead of 1952, 1942, or 1932, when severe 
malapportionment also existed.156  The timing of the Court’s 
intervention in the redistricting field and the strictly egalitarian 
nature of that intervention make sense, however, when a regime-
politics lens is employed. 
A regime-politics perspective places constitutional change in a 
larger political context, recognizing that it is often the result of a 
coordinated, inter-branch partisan campaign.157  The Court’s 
reapportionment revolution, according to this view, resulted 
generally from the electoral success of the Democratic Party and 
more specifically from the efforts of the Kennedy 
Administration.158  Democrats dominated presidential and 
congressional elections from 1932 through 1966 and, over those 
three-and-a half decades, controlled the White House nearly 
 
J. 261, 261–76 (2013); see also ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 152, at 
95.   
 155.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 77–88, 116–25 (1980).  In the former section, Ely discusses 
the democratic principles embodied in the Constitution and the importance of 
representation in the functioning of those principles.  In the latter section, he 
addresses the importance of the Court’s role in the reapportionment cases in 
advancing the democratic principles previously discussed.  See also JEFFREY 
ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 126 (2006).  
 156.  Terri Peretti, Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review and the 
Challenge of Partisan Polarization, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 843, 854–55 (2014) 
(adapting Cass Sunstein’s question regarding why the Supreme Court 
recognized an individual right to gun ownership under the Second 
Amendment “in 2008, rather than 1958, 1968, 1978 or 1998,” in order to 
discuss the reapportionment cases from a regime politics perspective); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 247 (2008)); see also ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra 
note 152, at 25–34. 
 157.  See generally Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: 
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); 
see also Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political 
Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme 
Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 585–96 (2005). 
 158.  See Peretti, supra note 156, at 855–56. 
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eighty percent of the time159 and Congress ninety percent of the 
time.160  This translated directly into Democratic control of federal 
judicial appointments.  Especially significant in terms of its 
ideological impact on the Supreme Court, in 1962 President 
Kennedy replaced Justice Whittaker with Justice White and 
Justice Frankfurter with Justice Goldberg, which shifted the 
Court dramatically to the left.161  Also relevant was John 
Kennedy’s campaign theme, both as a senator and a presidential 
candidate, regarding “the crisis of the cities,” which resulted, he 
said, from “political discrimination” against the urban majority.  
This campaign continued after Kennedy arrived in the White 
House, including Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Deputy 
Attorney General Byron White choosing to meet with the Baker 
attorneys and deciding to file an amicus brief in the case.162  The 
Administration continued to file briefs in the redistricting cases 
that followed and praised the Court for the favorable (i.e., liberal) 
decisions that resulted.163  Additionally, the Court’s intervention, 
combined with the largely Democratic composition of the federal 
bench in the 1960s, had a strong partisan impact, eliminating a 
longstanding Republican representational bias outside of the 
South.164  As explained by Cox and Katz, the Supreme Court 
 
 159.  See The Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
1600/presidents (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 160.   See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-
Divisions/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2014); Party Division in the Senate, 1789-
Present, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/ 
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).   
 161.  The percentage of conservative Court decisions fell from 42 percent 
in the 1960 term to 22 percent in the 1962 term, according to data from The 
Supreme Court Database.  See Analysis Specifications, SUPREME COURT 
DATABASE, http://www.scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (last visited  Jan. 21, 
2015). Using Martin-Quinn ideology scores—in which positive numbers 
indicate a conservative orientation and negative numbers indicate a liberal 
orientation—the median Justice on the Court changed from Justice Stewart 
in the 1960 term (with an ideology score of 0.533), to Justice White in the 
1961 term (-0.046), to Justice Goldberg in the 1962 term (-0.808), to Justice 
Brennan in the 1963 term (-0.874).  See Martin & Quinn, supra note 85. 
 162.  See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 152, at 1, 4. 
 163.  See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus at 15–16, Davis v. 
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (No. 69), 1963 WL 106063.   
 164.  See generally GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S 
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT 
REVOLUTION (2002). 
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altered the redistricting game, with rural state legislators no 
longer able to refuse to redistrict or to favor their own interests 
when doing so because there was a federal judge—in all 
likelihood, a Democratic federal judge—who could and did impose 
his or her own plan.165 
The key point is that the Supreme Court did not just 
neutrally advance democratic values with its reapportionment 
decisions.  The impetus for this doctrinal revolution was partisan.  
The Court in the 1960s was part of the Kennedy-Johnson 
Democratic regime, and it predictably advanced egalitarian values 
in a variety of doctrinal areas, including reapportionment.  The 
Court’s Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. 
Sims166 decisions unsurprisingly helped the Democratic Party’s 
urban, minority constituency, as well as Democratic politicians 
who had long suffered under rural, conservative domination in the 
legislatures.  The Court, in other words, advanced not just 
democratic values, but a Democratic agenda.  It was a partisan 
campaign, rather than a commitment to constitutional principles 
or democratic values, that transformed this field of constitutional 
law. 
B.  The Second Amendment.   
This lesson of the preeminent role of partisan politics in 
constitutional development is also evident in the Second 
Amendment doctrinal area.  The Supreme Court barely 
acknowledged the Second Amendment throughout the nineteenth 
and most of the twentieth century, and constitutional law 
casebooks rarely discussed it.  Yet the Court declared a robust 
individual right to gun ownership in the 2008 District of Columbia 
v. Heller case.167  This profound constitutional change, like that in 
the reapportionment field, was politically-driven.  Playing a key 
role in this particular constitutional revolution was a “powerful 
and aggressive social movement promoting public and judicial 
recognition of an individual right to have guns for nonmilitary 
purposes.”168  Its remarkable success is seen in the  existence 
 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 167.  554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008). 
 168.  Sunstein, supra note 156, at 252.  
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today of sizable majorities supporting gun rights169 and the 
commitments expressed in both the Democratic and Republican 
national platforms to a Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms.170 
When it comes to the Court adopting a new position on the 
Second Amendment, two developments are especially noteworthy.  
First is the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) organized 
“campaign” in the last few decades of the twentieth century “to 
develop a large body of literature supporting the individual right 
position and to create a perception that this view constitutes a 
standard model of scholarship.”171  The NRA’s efforts included 
distributing money to “friendly scholars,” launching an annual 
“Stand Up for the Second Amendment” essay contest (with a 
$25,000 prize), and funding a new organization called Academics 
for the Second Amendment that filed amicus briefs advancing the 
so-called standard model.172  These efforts paid off, with the 
number of law review articles advocating the individual right 
position growing from three in the 1960s to twenty-seven in the 
 
 169.  In a February 2008 USA Today/Gallup poll, seventy-three percent of 
Americans expressed the belief that the Second Amendment guarantees the 
rights of individuals, rather than members of state militias, to own guns, and 
nearly seventy percent of Americans opposed handgun bans.  Jeffrey M. 
Jones, Americans in Agreement With Supreme Court on Gun Rights, GALLUP 
(Jun. 26, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108394/americans-agreement-
supreme-court-gun-rights.aspx.  In a 2013 Rasmussen poll, nearly two-thirds 
of Americans believed that “the purpose of the Second Amendment is to make 
sure that people are able to protect themselves from tyranny.”  65% See Gun 
Rights As Protection Against Tyranny, RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 18, 2013),  
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/gun
_control/65_see_gun_rights_as_protection_against_tyranny.  
 170.  The 2012 Republican National Platform states, “[w]e uphold the 
right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a right which antedated the 
Constitution and was solemnly confirmed by the Second Amendment.”  GOV. 
BOB MCDONNELL ET AL., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 20 (2012), available at 
https://cdn.gop.com/docs/2012GOPPlatform.pdf.  The 2012 Democratic 
National Platform states, “[w]e recognize that the individual right to bear 
arms is an important part of the American tradition, and we will preserve 
Americans’ Second Amendment right to own and use firearms.” DEMOCRATIC 
PLATFORM 18 (2012), available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012-
National-Platform.pdf.  
 171.  Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment 
Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 24 (2000). 
 172.  See id. at 14. 
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1970s and 1980s to fifty-eight in the 1990s.173  Although both 
Scalia’s majority opinion and Stevens’s dissenting opinion in 
Heller examined the history of the Second Amendment, Scalia’s 
opinion asserting the individual right view relied more heavily on 
law review articles written by law professors, rather than those 
authored by trained historians.174 
Providing a significant boost to the NRA’s efforts was the 
electoral success of the Republican Party, which won five of the 
seven presidential elections from 1980 to 2004.  Executive branch 
support for gun rights followed, as “[p]rominent Justice 
Department officials in the Reagan, first Bush, and second Bush 
administrations publicly supported the individual rights 
interpretation of the Second Amendment and aggressively took 
steps to make their position the constitutional law of the land.”175  
This included vigorous support for an originalist interpretive 
approach that the Heller Court thoroughly embraced, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft committing George W. Bush’s 
administration to the individual right of gun ownership in a public 
letter to the NRA in 2001,176 and an amicus brief in Heller 
advancing the individual right view of the Second Amendment.177  
Republican appointments to the Supreme Court helped ensure 
that those arguments would be given a receptive hearing.  It is no 
surprise that each member of the Heller majority—Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito—was a Republican 
appointed by a Republican president.178  Like Baker, Heller 
 
 173.  See id. at 14–15.  In contrast, the number of law review articles 
supporting the collective right model remained relatively static at eleven in 
the 1960s, twenty-two in the 1970s and 1980s, and twenty-nine in the 1990s. 
See id.  
 174.  Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–86 (2008), 
with id. at 640–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 175.  HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 924–25 
(2013). 
 176.  Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S., to James J. 
Baker, Executive Director, National Rifle Ass’n  (May 17, 2001), available at 
http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf. 
 177.  Brief for Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of the Department of 
Justice in Support of Respondent, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 
405551.  
 178.  In all fairness, two of the dissenting Justices—Stevens and Souter—
were also Republicans appointed by Republican presidents.  Of course, they 
are also seen by the Republican Party faithful as “presidential mistakes” 
when it comes to Supreme Court appointments.  See Presidents sometimes 
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represents the “triumph of politics”179 and another example of the 
partisan orchestration of doctrinal change. 
C.  State Action.  
Doctrinal developments in the state action field during the 
twentieth century provide a final lesson of how partisan regimes 
construct constitutional law.  The liberalization of state action 
rules in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s was engineered by leaders in 
the Democratic Party,180 while its retrenchment in the several 
decades that followed can be credited to Republican Party 
elites.181 
Democratic leaders in the executive branch in the mid-
twentieth century encouraged the Supreme Court to adopt an 
expansive interpretation of state action rules in order to ban 
private race discrimination that a Southern-dominated Congress 
would not address.182  They did so through Supreme Court 
appointments and Justice Department litigation strategies that 
sought to broaden state action in areas perceived to be most 
important such as voting, housing, and public accommodations.183  
Court victories like Smith v. Allwright, Shelley v. Kraemer, and 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority then followed, along with 
enhanced judicial support for congressional efforts to battle 
private race discrimination.184  Because the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
prohibited a variety of forms of private race discrimination,185 
state action cases involving race largely disappeared from the 
federal court docket—along with pressure on the Court to stretch 
state action rules.  Unsurprisingly, the Court returned to a more 
modest view of state action. 
Reinforcing that trend was the ascendance of “the new right 
Republican regime.”186  Republican victories in five of six 
 
regret justices they appoint, USA TODAY (July 4, 2005), http://usa 
today30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-04-defiant-justices_x.htm. 
 179.  Sunstein, supra note 156, at 273. 
 180.  See Peretti, supra note 27, at 277–78. 
 181.  See id. at 288–89.  
 182.  See id. at 290–98. 
 183.  See id. 
 184.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Heart of Atl. 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 270 (1964). 
 185.   Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 186.  Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Political 
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presidential elections from 1968 to 1988 produced eleven 
consecutive Supreme Court appointment opportunities.  
Remarkably, nearly three-quarters of those GOP-controlled 
vacancies were “distal” in which the departing Justice resides at 
or on the opposite side of the Court median from the president;187 
it is precisely (and only) these types of vacancies that allow the 
president to “move the Court median” and alter Supreme Court 
ideology.188  In addition to their transformative Supreme Court 
appointments, Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan both 
campaigned against liberal judicial activism, arguing that 
unelected judges had seized power from elected officials—with 
Nixon pointing to Court decisions regarding school desegregation 
and law and order189 and Reagan emphasizing abortion and 
school prayer.190 Justice Department officials additionally gave 
speeches and published position papers advancing those 
conservative constitutional commitments.191  The Reagan Justice 
Department’s Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation, for 
example, advised government litigators on the use of originalism 
to reverse precedents involving, not only school prayer, the 
exclusionary rule, and abortion, but also the incorporation 
doctrine, a broad interpretation of congressional enforcement 
powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and an 
 
Determinants of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence: How 
the New Right Regime Has Shaped the Rehnquist Court, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 
1394 (2006).  
 187.  According to my analysis, eight of the eleven vacancies occurring 
from 1969 to 1992 were “distal” (Warren, Fortas, Black, Harlan, Douglas, 
Powell, Brennan, and Marshall), while three were “proximal” (Stewart, 
Burger, Rehnquist).  See Terri Peretti, Distal Vacancies, Partisan Regimes, 
and Supreme Court Ideology (Apr. 21–23, 2011) (prepared for Annual 
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Antonio, TX) (on 
file with author). 
 188.  Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median 
Game, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 231 (2007). 
 189.  See generally KEVIN MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT (2011). 
 190.  See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 175, at 737–43. 
 191.  See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES (2015); 
MCMAHON, supra note 189; STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
LEGAL MOVEMENT (2010); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988); OFFICE OF LEGAL 
POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: 
CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988); Edwin Meese III, 
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 
(1988). 
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expansive state action doctrine.192  Although this campaign was 
not always successful, the Republican regime made significant 
headway in altering constitutional law in a variety of doctrinal 
areas, including state action. 
Both the rise and the fall of the state action doctrine were 
engineered by partisan elites.  The lesson once again is that 
constitutional change requires more than the presence of effective 
scholarly critiques and a credible doctrinal alternative; it requires 
the support of an electorally-successful partisan movement.  Those 
seeking to reverse Tarkanian must learn this lesson and gain 
partisan support for their reform agenda. 
VI. FROM “HERE TO THERE:”  STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Creating a new constitutional rule or reversing a 
longstanding precedent sometimes requires an enormous step, a 
challenge given that the Court is more inclined to move 
incrementally than in large leaps and bounds.  When it comes to 
reversing Tarkanian, however, the doctrinal step is quite small 
and potential paths for that step have already been laid out by 
legal scholars and by the Court itself in Brentwood Academy.  The 
entwinement standard and the willingness to look beyond 
formalities and “winks and nods” could enable the Court to see the 
numerous financial linkages and dependencies between the NCAA 
and the state and recognize the truly monopolistic and coercive 
nature of NCAA power.  Like in Brentwood, the Court can also ask 
whether, on balance, it is unreasonable or unfair to ask that the 
NCAA observe constitutional standards. 
Reversal appears to be a small step, not only doctrinally, but 
also in terms of votes.  The Court has been closely divided on the 
question of whether amateur athletic associations are state actors, 
with both Tarkanian and Brentwood Academy being decided by a 
single vote and votes in the latter case also being ideologically-
ordered.  In counting potential votes for reversal, it should be 
noted that Scalia and Kennedy, the only two remaining Tarkanian 
Justices, voted against the state action claims in both Tarkanian 
and Brentwood Academy and are unlikely sources.193  Justice 
 
 192.  See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 175, at 748–52. 
 193.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 305 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., 
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Thomas dissented in Brentwood Academy, preferring to rule that 
the TSSAA was not a state actor and further expressing in a 
footnote his disagreement with the implications of the 
entwinement standard: a reversal of Tarkanian and a new finding 
that the NCAA is a state actor.194  A reasonable expectation is 
that the other two conservative Justices currently on the Court 
and to the right of Kennedy—Roberts and Alito—would also reject 
state actor status for the NCAA.  It is probable, though not 
certain, that all four Democratic Justices would disagree and vote 
to reverse Tarkanian; after all, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
voted with the Brentwood majority and Sotomayor and Kagan lie 
ideologically between the two.195  This informal head count and 
best-case scenario for reformers suggest at least a one-vote deficit. 
Securing one additional vote sounds deceptively simple.  It 
would in fact require a vote switch from Scalia, Kennedy, or 
Thomas; ideologically-unexpected votes from Roberts or Alito; or 
the replacement of a conservative Justice with a liberal Justice.  
The latter option, moreover, involves two steps—a conservative 
Justice departing from the Court while a Democrat occupies the 
White House.  While certainly possible, it is less likely to the 
degree that modern Justices engage in strategic retirement.196  
Because the Democratic Party has historically been, and will 
probably continue to be, the most likely supporter of an expansive 
 
& Kennedy, J.); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).  
 194.  Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 935 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 195.  See Current Beliefs, SUP CT. IDEOLOGY PROJECT, http://sct.tahk.us/ 
current.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 196.  Although anecdotal evidence supports the claim that Supreme Court 
Justices time their retirements strategically—for example when a co-partisan 
president is in office—systematic empirical evidence is mixed.  Compare 
Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on 
the United States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25 (1993) (confirming 
strategic retirement); Kjersten R. Nelson & Eve M. Ringsmuth, Departures 
from the Court: The Political Landscape and Institutional Constraints, 37 AM. 
POL. RES. 486 (2009) (same); Ross M. Stolzenberg & James Lindgren, 
Retirement and Death in Office of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 47 
DEMOGRAPHY 269 (2010) (same), with Terri Peretti & Alan Rozzi, Modern 
Departures from the U.S. Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power? 30 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 131 (2011) (rejecting strategic retirement); Albert Yoon, 
Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Judges, 1869-2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 (2006) (same); Christopher J. 
W. Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme 
Court Vacancies, 1789-1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145 (2000) (same).  
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state action doctrine under which Tarkanian would be reversed, 
the wisest strategy for reversal, to put it simply and bluntly, is to 
elect more Democrats.  When the White House and Senate are 
controlled by the Democratic Party, courts move in a liberal 
direction, and conservative precedents like Tarkanian are more 
likely to fall.197 
In terms of a more specific litigation strategy, the history of 
state action rulings is instructive.  The Court has been much more 
likely in the past to accept state action claims that involve race,198 
suggesting that litigators would be wise to emphasize the racial 
angle where possible.  In fact, it is not difficult to demonstrate 
that NCAA policies and enforcement actions often have a 
disparate racial impact.  Eligibility rules based on grades and 
entrance examinations disproportionately exclude African 
American athletes from participation and have been labeled as 
“patently racist.”199  Its rules enforcing amateurism also are more 
likely to harm economically disadvantaged athletes who are 
disproportionately African American.200  A recent example is the 
case of basketball player Ben McLemore, whose partial academic 
disqualification by the NCAA in his first year at the University of 
Kansas delayed his entry into the NBA and ensured that his 
family would have to suffer another year of devastating 
poverty.201  Selective and uneven enforcement of NCAA rules is 
 
 197.  This scenario could also be aided by the appointment to the Supreme 
Court of Sri Srinivasan, placed on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by 
President Obama.  He is the first federal appellate judge of South Asian 
descent and is often touted as a likely Supreme Court nominee.  See Richard 
Wolf, Sri Srinivansan: Supreme Court Justice in the Making?, USA TODAY 
(May 23, 2013, 6:53pm), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/05/23/sri-
srinivasan-judge-supreme-court-circuit-dc-obama-bush/2351543/.  Judge 
Srinivasan could be another vote for Tarkanian’s reversal, given his fanatical 
support for the University of Kansas men’s basketball team. 
 198.  See Peretti, supra note 27. 
 199.  Greene, supra note 125, at 104; DelGreco K. Wilson, Black Athletes, 
Race and the Rise of NCAA Eligibility Requirements, THE BLACK CAGER (Sept. 
18, 2014), http://delgrecowilson.com/2014/09/18/black-athletes-race-and-the-
rise-of-ncaa-eligibility-requirements/. 
 200.  See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, Race And the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 
2012, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/opinion/nocera-
race-and-the-ncaa.html?_r=0. 
 201.  See Eric Prisbell, Kansas’ Ben McLemore Fights Through Poverty to 
NCAA’s Center Stage, USA TODAY (June 21, 2013, 3:39am), http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/big12/2013/02/27/big-12-mens-college-basket
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another potential source of race discrimination claims.202 
A final factor that could aid Tarkanian’s reversal is the 
increasingly hostile environment in which the NCAA finds 
itself.203  In the past, the NCAA enjoyed a glow of deference and 
good will, which has helped it in its dealings with Congress and 
the courts, and both have been quite kind to the NCAA.  The 
courts have shielded the NCAA from both constitutional 
constraints and state regulation, and its Tarkanian ruling seems 
“frozen in time.”204  The NCAA has been the subject of numerous 
congressional hearings, including a dozen formal hearings over 
the last decade, but none thus far have produced any formal 
legislative action.205  Recent years have seen an increase, 
however, in both the negative tone of those hearings and the 
presence of opposition from both sides of the aisle.  Examples 
abounded at the Senate Commerce Committee hearing held on 
July 9, 2014.206  Especially striking were statements by Senators 
Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and Dean Heller (R-NV), challenging the 
very existence of the NCAA and questioning why it should not be 
disbanded.207  Furthermore, a number of bipartisan bills have 
been introduced, such as the NCAA Accountability Act that would 
guarantee four-year athletic scholarships, require annual baseline 
concussion tests, permit universities to pay stipends to their 
 
ball-kansas-jayhawks-ben-mclemore/1947401/. 
 202.  See Nocera, supra note 200. 
 203.  See Branch, supra note 41; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, The College Sports 
Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A23, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/nocera-the-college-sports-cartel.html; Joe 
Nocera, Op-Ed, The N.C.A.A.’s Ethics Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013, at 
A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/opinion/nocera-the-
ncaas-ethics-problem.html; Nocera, supra note 5; Nocera, supra note 5; 
Norman Ornstein, Why Hasn’t Congress Investigated Corruption in the 
NCAA?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2014, 12:05pm), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
entertainment/archive/2014/04/why-hasn’t-congress-investigated-corruption-i
n-the-ncaa/360391/. 
 204.  Koller, supra note 120, at 183. 
 205.  See, e.g., Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the 
Consequences of Unionizing Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Educ. & 
the Workforce Comm., 113th Cong. (2014); Promoting the Well-Being and 
Academic Success of College Athletes: Hearing Before U.S. S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Well-Being 
Hearing]. 
 206.  Well-Being Hearing, supra note 205.  
 207.  Id. (statements of Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO) & Sen. Dean Heller 
(R-NV)).  
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athletes, and mandate due process protections prior to the 
imposition of NCAA sanctions.208  While there is currently little 
optimism regarding the passage of such bills, the threat of 
legislation on this and a range of other important NCAA matters, 
including anti-trust and tax exemptions, may prompt the 
Association to act in order to avoid congressional intervention, as 
it did after a 1978 Senate report that recommended federal 
regulation of the NCAA’s enforcement procedures.209 
Greater media scrutiny and harsh press reports in recent 
years are also contributing to the NCAA’s increasingly tarnished 
image.210  This loss of credibility is important as it enhances the 
possibility of unfriendly government action.  Much of the recent 
negative press has focused on multiple lawsuits that have been 
filed against the NCAA,211 including a class action suit by Jeff 
Kessler on behalf of college athletes alleging that the NCAA and 
 
 208.  H.R.J. Res. 2903, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 209.  The NCAA amended its enforcement processes after the Senate held 
hearings and published its report, S. REP. 95-69 (1978), suggesting future 
federal regulation.  See NATHAN BROOKS, THE NCAA AND DUE PROCESS: LEGAL 
ISSUES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2004), available at http:// 
congressionalresearch.com/RL32529/document.php?study=The+NCAA+and+
Due+Process+Legal+Issues. 
 210.  See, e.g., Branch, supra note 41; see also supra note 203. 
 211.  See, e.g., Dennis Dodd, Potential landmark cases make these perilous 
times for the NCAA, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:44am), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/21563406/potential-landmark-
casesmake-theseperiloustimes-for-the-ncaa; Nathan Fenno, New lawsuit 
targets NCAA, 11 conferences over scholarships, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014, 
4:23 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-lawsuit-targets-
ncaa-scholarships-20140425-story.html; Sara Ganim, ‘Amateurism is a myth’: 
Athletes file class-action against NCAA,” CNN (Apr. 5, 2014, 2:35 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/17/justice/ncaa-student-athletes-payment-
lawsuit/; George, supra note 44; Peter Hall, Judge: Paterno suit targeting 
Penn State sanctions can move toward trial, MORNING CALL (Sept. 11, 2014, 
8:14 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-penn-state-paterno-ncaa-
lawsuit-advances-20140911-story.html; Jerry Hinnen, Labor attorney Jeffrey 
Kessler files antitrust lawsuit vs. NCAA, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:42 
AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/24488 
838/labor-attorney-jeffrey-kessler-files-antitrust-lawsuit-vs-ncaa; John 
Keilman, NCAA reaches $75 million settlement in concussion lawsuit, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (July 29, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/local/breaking/chi-ncaa-reaches_75-million-settlement-in-concussion-la
wsuit-20140729-story.html; Joe Nocera, The Lawsuit and the N.C.A.A., N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
06/22/opinion/nocera-the-lawsuit-and-the-ncaa.html; Nocera, supra note 3.   
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the five major athletic conferences constitute a cartel.212  Each 
lawsuit inspires another, which inspires another, which increases 
the appearance of NCAA vulnerability.  Especially significant, the 
lawsuits provide courts with more opportunities to evaluate NCAA 
policies and practices.  One or more of these cases could make 
their way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
All of these factors—a more Democratic federal bench, the 
strategic selection of cases raising race-related claims, growing 
congressional hostility, multiple lawsuits against the NCAA, 
mounting media criticism, and an increasingly negative public 
image for the NCAA—all lend themselves to Tarkanian’s reversal.  
It is not unreasonable to believe that NCAA enforcement actions 
could be subjected to judicial review in the not so distant future. 
VII. “AND BEYOND:”  THE CONSEQUENCES OF REVERSING TARKANIAN 
Reversing Tarkanian opens the door to judicial oversight of 
the NCAA.  State actor status for the NCAA brings judges into its 
investigatory and enforcement processes and alters the power 
relationships among the key players.  This is precisely what 
happened in the reapportionment field once judicial intervention 
was permitted.  After 1962, state legislators were no longer free to 
do whatever they wanted when it came to redistricting.  Federal 
judges were guaranteed a seat at the redistricting table and were 
empowered to assert constitutional interests, particularly those of 
underrepresented urban minorities.213  With Tarkanian’s 
reversal, federal judges would similarly be empowered.  They 
could assess the substantive and procedural fairness of NCAA 
policies and practices and protect the liberty and property 
interests of college athletes, coaches, and member institutions.  
The NCAA would be forced to become more attentive to those 
interests and would need to reform “the arbitrary and opaque 
enforcement process [it] currently utilize[s].”214 
It is well-known that government agencies are most effective 
and responsive when their clients are well-organized and 
 
 212.  See Jon Solomon, Meet Jeffrey Kessler, lawyer whose suit strikes fear 
in NCAA’s heart, CBS Sports (Nov. 4, 2014, 1:26 PM), http://www. 
cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24783680/meet-jeffrey-kessle
r-lawyer-whose-suit-strikes-fear-in-ncaas-heart. 
 213.  See generally COX & KATZ, supra note 164. 
 214.  Fogarty, supra note 5. 
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powerful.  A classic example is the Social Security Administration, 
whose effectiveness is in large part a product of the political power 
of its clientele.  The elderly vote at very high rates, their interests 
are well-represented by the American Association of Retired 
Persons, and members of Congress ensure that Social Security 
benefits are both generous and effectively administered.215  The 
Federal Aviation Administration and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission are also regarded as effective government agencies, 
which is similarly a result of their well-organized and influential 
clientele—the airline industry and the securities industry, 
respectively.216  The inverse relationship holds as well: 
organizations serving a weak clientele are more prone to 
corruption, incompetence, and abuse of power.  Such imbalances of 
power are readily apparent, for example, with welfare agencies in 
relation to welfare recipients, prison officials in relation to 
prisoners, and law enforcement agencies in relation to criminal 
suspects.  It is no surprise that the clients of these agencies have 
had to turn to the courts for the protection of their rights.217 
When it comes to college athletes, they too have been poorly-
organized and weak in relation to the NCAA.  They have had to 
accept scholarships that were not guaranteed beyond a single 
year, a persistent gap between the scholarship amount and the 
true cost of their college education, and few procedural protections 
when the NCAA investigates potential rule violations and imposes 
sanctions.  The University, in theory, could act as an effective 
counter-weight to NCAA power, but its tremendous financial 
 
 215.  See Naureen Khan, Is the AARP the ‘900-pound invisible gorilla’ in 
the room, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 22, 2014, 7:00 AM), http:// 
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/22/is-the-aarp-the-900poundinvisiblego
rillaintheroom.html. 
 216.  See Steven M. Davidoff, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory 
Capture, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 11, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://deal 
book.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture/? 
_r=0.  Of course, responsiveness sometimes goes too far in the form of “agency 
capture” in which the agency is captured by the interests it is supposed to 
regulate instead of advancing broader public interests.  See generally HUGH 
HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS (1977); George Stigler, The theory of 
economic regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 217.  The Supreme Court has acted to protect the due process rights of 
welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), prisoners in 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and probationers and parolees in 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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interests do not always coincide with the needs of athletes and 
coaches.  A declaration by the Supreme Court that the NCAA is a 
state actor will give legal standing to athletes and coaches to 
assert constitutional claims against the Association.  Judges can 
explore what due process requires when the liberty and property 
interests of athletes and coaches are harmed by NCAA 
enforcement actions.  Judges might decide that the NCAA must 
provide parties with the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses.  Judges might decide that the NCAA cannot serve 
simultaneously as an investigator, prosecutor, and judge and that 
athletes and coaches accused of wrong-dong must be provided with 
a neutral, third-party decision maker.  These are desirable 
changes from the longstanding practice in which “only the NCAA’s 
own version of due process . . . constrain[s] it.”218 
By reversing NCAA v. Tarkanian and treating the NCAA as a 
state actor, the Association would be held to constitutional 
requirements, such as due process of law.  Judicial oversight of 
NCAA enforcement proceedings would promote basic fairness to 
those individuals and institutions whose interests can be so 
greatly harmed.  As the Supreme Court said in Brentwood 
Academy, that is not unreasonable. 
 
 
 218.  PORTO, supra note 55, at 161. 
